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Adaptive Preferences, Adapted Preferences 
P ​OLLY ​M ​ITCHELL 
University College London 
polly.mitchell@ucl.ac.uk 
People who have not personally experienced diseases, disabilities and health conditions tend                       
to judge them to be worse than they are reported to be by people who have experienced them                                   
(Ubel et al. ​2005). This phenomenon, dubbed the ​disability paradox​, presents a challenge for                           
health policy. Given that assessments of the utility of health states are widely used as a                               
measure health outcome, using patient, rather than public, assessments will radically change                       
the distribution of healthcare resources.  
This divergence between public and patient preferences is most plausibly explained as a                         
result of hedonic adaptation (Loewenstein and Ubel 2008). Hedonic adaptation is a                       
widespread phenomenon such that people tend to adapt fairly quickly to the state they are in,                               
good or bad, and adjust their baseline utility accordingly. On the whole, after someone                           
undergoes a major change in health or life circumstances, their self-reported quality of life                           
drops or rises back to pre-event levels surprisingly quickly. Adaptation is not, however,                         
widely recognised by people who haven’t had the experience in question, nor indeed is it                             
always recognised by people who ​have previously had the experience in question—hence the                         
difference in public and patient assessment (Hausman 2015, pp.93–4). 
One solution to the disability paradox is to show that patient utilities are inappropriate for                             
use in public policy decision-making. This paper offers a critique of one such approach: the                             
common assumption that adaptation leads to malformed or irrational preferences, sometimes                     
called ​adaptive preferences​. I consider three philosophical accounts of adaptive preferences:                     1
Jon Elster’s ​procedural account, Luc Bovens’ ​formal account, Martha Nussbaum’s                   
substantive account. I argue that none of these accounts characterise adapted patient                       
preferences as irrational. ​Adapted preferences should not be treated as synonymous with                       
adaptive preferences. I suggest that much patient adaptation should be understood as a form                           
of the ubiquitous human ability to respond to environmental change. Moreover, because they                         
amount to testimonial denial, attributions of adaptive preferences should be made with                       
caution. As such, we ought not to discount patient preferences. 
 
1. The disability paradox 
Health state utility values are widely used as a measure of health benefit, for calculating                             
quality adjusted life years (QALYs), determining the cost-effectiveness of drugs and public                       
health programmes, and determining the effectiveness of treatments in particular populations.                     
They capture, in some sense, how good or bad it is to be in a particular health state.                                   
Typically, utility values are calculated by eliciting the preferences of a large sample of                           
members of the public, who are roughly demographically representative of the overall                       
population, but who do not necessarily have personal experience of the conditions in                         
question. Public utility values therefore don’t capture the quality of life associated with each                           
health state, where this is a measure of what it’s like to be in that state, but something like                                     
how much people want to avoid being in the state (Wolff et al. 2012, pp.460–1). Utility                               
values can also be elicited by patients, who ​do have personal experience of the health                             
conditions in question. In these cases, utility values also capture the extent to which patients                             
1 See, for example, introduction to Raikkä and Varelius 2013. 
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want to be free from a particular health state, but from the perspective of someone who is                                 
currently experiencing it.  
2
Non-patients tend to overestimate the health losses and underestimate the health gains                       
associated with many health states, in comparison to the reports of people with those health                             
states. So, for example, in one study women without experience of breast cancer valued                           
having and living with a mastectomy significantly lower than women who had experienced                         
breast cancer, most of whom had undergone mastectomy (Ashby et al. 1994). In another,                           
patients who had undergone colostomy as a result of surgery for rectal cancer assigned higher                             
utilities to colostomy than did patients who had been treated for rectal cancer by radiotherapy                             
without colostomy (Boyd et al. 1990). In such cases, patients report their condition to be less                               
disabling, or have a smaller impact on their well-being, compared to the judgements of                           
non-patients. This phenomenon, known as the ​disability paradox is widespread, observed                     
across many different types of disease and disability (Ubel et al. 2005; Dolan and Kahneman                             
2008, pp.222–3). 
Using utility values elicited by the public, rather than values elicited by patients who                           
have the condition in question, will have a significant impact on the allocation of healthcare                             
resources (Dolan and Kahneman 2008, pp.223–4; Loewenstein and Ubel 2008, p.1799). If we                         
take the utility values elicited by patients to accurately represent their well-being, their                         
possible health gains will be much smaller than if we use the utility values elicited by the                                 
public for the same conditions. Using higher utility values (typically patient values) means                         
that health states will be taken to be less disabling, and to have less serious health detriments,                                 
and as such, curing them will result in fewer QALYs gained, or a smaller health benefit.                               
Using lower values (typically public values) means that conditions represent a more                       
significant health burden, and as such, curing them will result in more QALYs gained, or a                               
larger health benefit. Public utility values will thus justify greater use of resources in their                             
mitigation and prevention (Brock 2004, pp.204–5). Treatments which would have been                     
deemed cost effective had the lower value been used may end up not being deemed cost                               
effective using the higher value, resulting in their not being commissioned, or their                         
deprioritisation (Ubel et al. 2003, p.600). This is particularly likely to be true in the case of                                 
physical disabilities, where adaptation is most evident, and mobility issues, where the                       
discrepancy between public and patient values is large (Wolff et al.​ ​2012, p.457).  3
This divergence constitutes a challenge for health policy decision-making. In the absence                       
of further evidence to suggest that either patient or public assessments better represent how                           
2 Measuring health state utility by eliciting preferences is a complex and controversial matter. There is                               
some ambiguity about what exactly is being measured, and the presence of framing, focussing and                             
anchoring effects calls into question whether such measures reliably capture people’s preferences at                         
all (see Hausman 2015, especially chapters 7 and 8). I will put these difficulties to one side in this                                     
paper. For the sake of my argument, I assume that the measurement of health state utility does                                 
capture, in some genuine sense, people’s preferences. 
3 In some cases, particularly mental health conditions, the effect may be reversed. Depressed people,                             
for example, judge the quality of life associated with depression to be worse than the public perceive                                 
it to be (Pyne et al. 2009), and patients with dementia and their carers give systematically lower utility                                   
scores to dementia states than members of the general population (Rowen et al. 2015). In such cases,                                 
the use of public values is likely to result in ​fewer resources being used to prevent and treat these                                     
conditions, as they are seen as less disabling than they would be judged to be if patient values were                                     
used. This is not straightforwardly related to adaptation, and may be the result of stigma associated                               
with some diseases, or failure to understand what they entail. Nonetheless, it presents similar                           
problems for decision-making about healthcare resource distribution. 
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bad it is to be in a given health state, there is no clear answer as to whose values to use in                                           
cost-effectiveness analysis. On the one hand, non-patients generally have limited information                     
about a given health state and what it’s like to be in it, given that they have no lived                                     
experience of it. This may be a prima facie ​reason for preferring patient utility values as a                                 
measure of how good or bad it is to have a particular condition. However, public utility                               
values may instead reflect, or at least partly reflect, people’s fear about getting a condition,                             
rather than their considered preferences about what it’s like to be in that state (Dolan and                               
Kahneman 2008). The lower utility values that the public ascribe to health states may thus                             
register a genuine and widely shared preference that has relevance for health-policy                       
decision-making. This would suggest that patient experience doesn’t capture everything that                     
is relevant for measuring utility in a public policy context (Wolff et al. 2012, p.460–1). Of                               
course, some diseases and disabilities are highly stigmatised, and in these cases public                         
preferences may reflect prejudicial attitudes. It may be inappropriate to make policy decisions                         
on the basis of such preferences, if they are distorted by stigma. 
Moreover, patients may misrepresent how bad it is to have a disease or condition, such                             
that their valuation of their own health state is distorted or misguided in some sense. Some                               
cases appear to support this claim. For example, one study showed that patients who had                             
previously had a colostomy bag, now removed, valued the utility of living with a colostomy                             
bag almost identically to people who had never had a colostomy bag. Moreover, both groups                             
valued this state much lower than those currently experiencing living with a colostomy bag                           
(Hausman 2015, pp.93–4). Given the reversion to the lower utility value, even having                         
experienced living with a colostomy bag, cases like this may suggest that the patient’s                           
reported utility is mistaken. If patient preferences can be characterised as misguided or                         
irrational, they will fail to capture utility accurately, and can for that reason be discounted                             
from social choice functions. That being the case, the disability paradox would fade away. 
 
2. Hedonic adaptation 
The most plausible explanation of the divergence between public and patient assessment of                         
disease and ill health is ​hedonic adaptation ​. Hedonic adaptation is a widespread feature of                           
reported health-related quality of life. After a change in life circumstances, people tend to                           
adapt fairly quickly to the state they are in, good or bad, and adjust their reported utility                                 
accordingly (Kahneman 2000). As such, reported utility or quality of life drops or rises back                             
to pre-event levels surprisingly quickly. So, for example, accident survivors who have                       
sustained paraplegia or quadriplegia report happiness levels only slightly lower than those                       
reported by non-disabled control groups within a year of the event (Brickman ​et al. 1978).                             
Patients who have lost limbs to cancer or suffered burn injuries report similar quality of life                               
and psychiatric symptoms to control groups (Dolan and Kahneman 2008, p.218).                     
Furthermore, for people who have experienced major negative changes in their health status                         
in the past, the onset of new conditions is less likely to result in self-reports of worse health,                                   
indicating a resilience to new threats to quality of life (ibid.). 
Adaptation also occurs in a non-health context: after receiving a pay rise or getting                           
married, individuals’ reported happiness levels significantly rise, but then return to their                       
baseline within a short time period; after the death of a spouse, a widowed person’s reported                               
happiness levels return to their baseline after, on average, eight years (ibid.). At a population                             
level, while real income in Japan increased fivefold between 1958 and 1987, self reported                           
happiness did not change (Kahneman 2000, pp.686). While adaptation is common, it is not                           
universal. For example, there is evidence that people do not adapt their utility levels in                             
response to unemployment, and people exhibit ​increased sensitisation to annoying noise over                       
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time (Frederick and Loewenstein 1999, p.311). In the heath context, there are a number of                             
cases where adaptation does not occur: for example, people suffering from long-term                       
unexplained pain do not experience adaptation, with reported quality of life getting worse                         
over time (Dolan and Kahneman 2008, p.218). Experiencing repeated episodes of pain may                         
also make patients ​less resilient in the face of future stressful events. Adaptation does not                             
appear to occur in degenerative illness, where a patient’s health status is continually changing                           
(Frederick and Loewenstein 1999, p.312). 
Although hedonic adaptation is common, people largely fail to recognise its existence,                       
expecting positive and negative experiences to last longer than they actually do, not only                           
when judging how they will feel in the future but also when estimating other people’s                             
well-being following an episode of good fortune or ill health (Dolan and Kahneman 2008,                           
p.221–223; Kahneman and Thaler 2006, pp.229–31). This accounts for the public judging                       
health states to be worse than patients report them to be. 
There are a number of proposed explanations for how and why adaptation occurs. Most                           
focus around the idea of a ​response shift​, that is, that people’s internal standards, values, and                               
conception of well-being change. Adaptation is described as a treadmill effect: people                       
respond to changes in their health or life status by adjusting their evaluative standards, and as                               
such the well-being they experience remains broadly stable around a baseline level                       
(Brickman and Campbell 1971, p.287). This effect is demonstrated in an oft-cited study,                         
which found that lottery winners rated their present happiness only slightly higher than                         
controls, and people who had sustained paraplegia or quadriplegia in an accident rated their                           
present happiness only slightly lower (Brickman et al​. 1978, p.921). Both lottery winners and                           
paraplegic people rated their past happiness as higher than members of the control group,                           
which seems to indicate a nostalgia effect, where past experiences are remembered as better                           
than they actually were experienced as being (ibid. p.924). 
There are several ways in which people exhibiting adaptation are thought to change their                           
standards of evaluation. For example, it has been suggested that paraplegic people compare                         
their well-being and function to that of other people with paraplegia, rather than to the                             
population in general, and that people who have experienced a major negative life event                           
compare their current well-being with the very negative well-being experienced in the                       
transition period immediately following the change, rather than comparing it with their                       
pre-event experiences, in both cases artificially increasing their reported well-being (Ubel et                       
al. 2003, p.604). Changing standards might, to some extent at least, be appropriate. Consider                           
a 30-year-old and an 85-year-old, who both rate their well-being as 95 out of 100. It would be                                   
reasonable to expect that there would be significant differences in their physical and                         
psychosocial function, and that their answers might reflect their expectations of best possible                         
quality of life, given their age and context, rather than some external, contextless scale of                             
well-being (ibid., p.602). However, such relativism may sometimes be inappropriate. For                     
example, if someone with symptomatic heart failure uses other heart failure patients as a                           
benchmark for their well-being, rather than normal age-appropriate adults, they may be in                         
danger of failing to take into account the impact of their functionally limiting symptoms on                             
their well-being. Other aspects of adaptation may include learning to cope with limited                         
function by acquiring or developing skills, lowering expectations of feasible function and                       
accomplishment, and changing opinions about what it takes to be happy, or to live a fulfilling                               
life (Ubel et al 2003, p.604; Menzel​ ​et al. 2002, p.2152). 
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3. Formal and procedural adaptive preferences 
If those preferences resulting from hedonic adaptation, or ​adapted preferences​, can be shown                         
to be mistaken, patient preferences could be justifiably discounted. One way of characterising                         
the mistakenness of adapted preferences is by classifying them as ​adaptive preferences ​.                       
Although in some sense all of our preferences develop and adapt in response to our                             
environment, adaptive preferences are those preferences which have adapted in such a way as                           
to make them irrational or otherwise unreliable in reflecting our actual attitudes (Begon 2015,                           
p.243).  
4
A few examples will elucidate the nature of those preferences typically considered to be                           
adaptive. Martha Nussbaum gives several compelling examples of women in oppressive                     
personal and socio-economic contexts in India, for whom it seems obvious that the standards                           
by which they measure their well-being or internal state are distorted, and their resulting                           
preferences are problematically adaptive (2000a, pp.112–113). Vasanti, after years in an                     
abusive marriage, thought her abuse to be a normal part of a woman’s life, something to be                                 
expected once she left her family home to live with her husband. Jayamma, despite being                             
paid less than men for more demanding factory work, accepted that this was how things were,                               
and, knowing change was not possible, did not even waste energy lamenting her situation.                           
And severely malnourished women in Andhra Pradesh, prior to the efforts of a government                           
consciousness-raising program, didn’t consider themselves to be malnourished, or their                   
conditions to be unhealthy. Examples like these are widely reported. Women who experience                         
violence at the hands of their partner are less likely to seek medical care, not only for any                                   
resulting injuries, but also preventative care such as cancer screening and blood pressure                         
checks (Garcia-Moreno et al. 2012, p.5). People in abusive relationships sometimes grow to                         
feel guilt and shame for their own actions, blame themselves for misstepping, and feel that                             
they deserve punishment (O’Neill and Kerig 2000). People from oppressed ethnic minorities                       
in racist societies experience losses in self-confidence, motivation and self-esteem, in                     
response to their treatment as inferior (Nagel 1973, p.350).  
Adaptive preferences are typically characterised by a number of features, including                     
changes in self-perception; incorrect judgement about the appropriateness of the actions of                       
others, or judgement against incorrect standards; and pursuit of self-destructive or                     
self-deprecating ends. As patient adaptation is also characterised by changes in                     
self-perception and changes in internal standards of judgement of oneself and others, it seems                           
to be a ​prima facie candidate for a type of adaptive preference. Given that patient adaptation                               
results in patients assigning high utilities to disease states, which can lead to a preference                             
ranking of disease states over non-disease states at the personal level, and the downgrading of                             
the health-related costs of particular diseases and disabilities in social choice functions, such                         
adaptation can also plausibly be described as self-destructive. 
There are three principal accounts of adaptive preferences that ostensibly give credence                       
to the view that patient preferences should not be used in utility functions: (1) Jon Elster’s                               
4 Sometimes adaptation and adaptive preferences are treated as synonymous. For example, many of                           
the contributors to Juha Räikkä’s and Jukka Varelius’ comprehensive edited volume on the subject                           
(2013) appear to use the two concepts interchangeably. I start with the assumption, shared by Jessica                               
Begon (2015), that not all adaptation is adaptive. If the two are ​not synonymous—as I argue in this                                   
paper—adaptive preferences will form only a subset of adapted preferences, that is, those adapted                           
preferences which are irrational or misguided. The terminological resemblance of ‘adapted                     
preferences’ and ‘adaptive preferences’ is, perhaps, unfortunate. However, it serves the purpose of                         
highlighting the close relationship between the two, even if, as I will argue, they turn out to be                                   
non-identical. 
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procedural account, which takes the problem with adaptive preferences to be that they come                           
about in the wrong way; (2) Luc Bovens’ ​formal account, according to which the problem is                               
the conflict between adaptive preferences and other preferences; and (3) Martha Nussbaum’s                       
substantive account, which contends that adaptive preferences, which are typically formed in                       
deprived contexts, are in conflict with goods which have intrinsic value. In this and the                             
following section, I consider each in turn. I argue that in fact none of these accounts of                                 
adaptive preferences show adapted patient preferences to be adaptive preferences. 
Jon Elster (1983) argues that adaptive preference change is non-autonomous and so                       
irrational. Elster distinguishes adaptive preference formation from deliberate character                 
planning, both of which occur in the context of reduced possibilities: the former is a causal,                               
non-conscious process motivated by a drive to reduce the frustration that results from                         
unsatisfied desires; the latter is the deliberate, intentional shaping of desires. For Elster, the                           
prototypical example of adaptive preferences comes from La Fontaine’s fable of the fox and                           
the grapes. Upon realising that he cannot reach the grapes that he so desires, and rather than                                 
admit defeat, the fox resolves that they look sour and that he didn’t want them anyway. In                                 
contrast, a character planning fox, realising that he cannot reach the grapes and finding only                             
sour cherries within his reach—usually not sweet enough for his taste—decides to try to learn                             
to like the cherries. After a while, he finds that he actually prefers the tartness of the cherries                                   
to grapes: he has brought about a preference change in himself. These are both examples of                               
cognitive dissonance reduction: rather than live with an unsatisfied desire, the fox changes his                           
desires. The difference, according to Elster, is that whereas the adaptive fox undergoes a                           
change in preference motivated by a non-autonomous subconscious drive, the character                     
planning fox undergoes a genuine change in preference, motivated by an autonomous                       
second-order preference, The first fox’s alleged preference change seems insincere and                     
resentful, and would undoubtedly be reversed if he found a way to reach the grapes, whereas                               
the second fox’s preference change is genuine and stable. Elster also describes adaptive                         
preferences as typically downgrading inaccessible options, whereas deliberate character                 
planning typically upgrades accessible ones.  
Luc Bovens (1992) criticises Elster’s account of the mechanism of adaptive preferences,                       
though he broadly agrees that sour-grapes-type situations tend to lead to irrational                       
preferences, and character planning tends to result in rational preferences. He argues that                         
Elster’s distinction between intentional, conscious meta-preferences about what your                 
preferences should be and unintentional, unconscious, mechanistic drives does not in fact                       
track the distinction between rational and irrational preferences. There are many parts of our                           
identity which aren’t consciously decided—sexual preferences perhaps, or music taste—but                   
which are not thereby irrational. Donald Bruckner similarly suggests that non-conscious                     
adaptation to changed circumstances can be conducive to subjective well-being, and that to                         
adopt such preferences is more rational than not (Bruckner 2009, p.315). Instead, for Bovens,                           
what makes a changed preference irrational is a conflict with other preferences of the same                             
type that the agent continues to hold. So, when the fox states his preference not to eat the                                   
bunch of grapes because they look sour, but retains a general preference to eat grapes that                               
look similar, his token preference not to eat the grapes contradicts his type preference to                             
generally eat similar grapes. The character planning fox, on the other hand, has rational                           
preferences: his preferences towards the types ‘sweet fruits’ and ‘sour fruits’ have changed                         
such that his token preference for sour cherries over grapes is not in tension with his overall                                 
preference set. Other accounts of adaptive preferences give a similarly formal explanation of                         
their irrationality: Bruckner (2009), for example, argues that irrational preferences are those                       
that are not reflectively endorsed by the agent; John Christman (2014) suggests that                         
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autonomous preferences are those that are reflexively endorsed by an agent, and form part of                             
a self-affirming practical identity. 
If the preference changes that patients undergo are generated by the kind of                         
non-intentional drive that Elster describes in the case of the adaptive fox, or if they are in                                 
conflict with general preference types, as Bovens outlines, then describing the lower utility                         
values reported by patients adaptive preferences may be justified. For Elster, patient                       
preferences which develop unconsciously, non-intentionally, and are motivated out of a drive                       
to resolve the frustration of not being able to satisfy previously held preferences, would be                             
classed as irrational, and so as adaptive preferences. For Bovens, patient preferences which                         
conflict with their other preferences—for example, a patient with chronic kidney disease who                         
reports minimal change in quality of life despite having to attend 12 hours of haemodialysis                             
per week, but who also reports a strong preference for time spent out of hospital over time                                 
spent in hospital—would be similarly irrational.  
Though neither Elster nor Bovens discuss changes in health-related preferences directly,                     
there is reason to think that neither the procedural nor formal description of irrational                           
preferences in their accounts fully explain adapted patient preferences about health states. A                         
detailed characterisation of the mechanisms of adaptation (Menzel et al. 2002) identifies a                         
variety of changes and mechanisms which seem to point towards far more complexity in                           
patient adaptation than either Elster or Bovens’ accounts allow for. Elements of adaptation                         
may include cognitive denial of functional health state, suppressed recognition of full health,                         
skill enhancement, activity adjustment, substantive goal adjustment, altered conception of                   
health, lowered expectations and heightened stoicism (ibid., pp.5151–2). Differences in                   
patients’ reported wellbeing immediately after contracting a disease or health condition and                       
after they have lived with the condition for a few months or years, are understood to be down                                   
to a combination of these factors. 
Some of these aspects of adaptation are roughly in line with Elster’s suggested                         
mechanism for adaptive preferences. For example, when patients exhibit cognitive denial of                       
functional health—wherein they find it hard to admit how bad their functioning really is—or                           
suppressed recognition of what full health would be like and what their current health state                             
prevents them from doing, their adapted preferences look much like Elster’s adaptive                       
preferences. Another feature of adaptation that is characteristic of Elster’s sour grapes                       
account is when patients lower their expectations about their own well-being and function,                         
which may represent a regrettable acceptance of a diminished life. Such features of                         
adaptation may also be taken to lead to irrational preferences on Bovens’ account, for                           
example, if cognitive denial, modified benchmarks and lowered expectations are confined to                       
preferences relating only to patients’ health, or relate only to the particular condition from                           
which they suffer and the ways in which it limits their behaviour and options. In such cases                                 
there may be contradictions between specific disease- and behaviour-related preferences and                     
general preferences of the same type. 
However other, more positive, elements of patient adaption are less obvious candidates                       
for adaptive preferences. For example consider patients who adjust their activities and                       
substantive goals, taking up new interests and activities which are allowed or enabled by their                             
impairment, or people who enhance their skills, either with respect to old or new goals and                               
activities, as a result of their ill health or disability. Some of these changes in commitments                               
might be motivated by a foreclosure of other options, for example, someone who gains a                             
newfound interest in creative writing because they are not able to engage in their previous                             
love of cycling, having lost the use of their lower limbs. This might constitute a substantial                               
change in goals. However other activities might be enabled by impairment, for example                         
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participation in disability sports, which are only open to those with physical or developmental                           
impairments, or new friendships and membership via patient support networks. Sometimes                     
such adaptation might constitute a change in activity which realises a consistent goal via a                             
different means: success in sport, for example. This would not necessarily imply a change of                             
preferences at all: rather, ill health or disability may necessitate changes in the means to                             
satisfaction of a patient’s preferences. Here adaptation appears to be a conscious and                         
intentional decision, motivated party by the foreclosure of some options, partly by the new                           
accessibility of others: perhaps more like character planning than sour grapes. Furthermore,                       
adaptation may not involve conflicting preferences, if it amounts to a comprehensive change                         
of preferences and goals.  
People with long term conditions and disabilities may also come to adopt a view that                             
health is not identical with high levels of physical functioning, and come to hold a more                               
holistic account of health—understood as the ability to live a full, purposive and valuable life,                             
rather than simply a matter of biological function—or they may realise that they can achieve                             
happiness without full health. This does not necessarily represent lower expectations, but a                         
change in priorities. After the onset of an illness, a patient’s internal standard for evaluating                             
their own health may change: what previously was taken to constitute a 0.5-type health state,                             
might, on reflection, and with experience, be reevaluated as a 0.75-type state instead (Ubel et                             
al. 2003, p.602). This might be best understood as neither sour-grapes-type adaptive                       
preferences nor as deliberate character planning, but something more like what Elster calls                         
‘learning and experience’ (1983, pp.113–5). Sometimes the status quo is preferred for no                         
reason other than its being the status quo, or because other options have not been                             
experienced, or because change itself is undesirable, and it takes experience of other ways of                             
living to agitate stagnated preferences. Experience of new options and different lifestyles can                         
be an opportunity for people to come to know their value, resulting in changed preferences.                             
This is different from character planning, in that an agent does not necessarily set out to                               
change her preferences and may resent the change at first, and different from adaptive                           
preferences, insofar as the preference change is informed and represents increased knowledge                       
of the option-set. Preference change through learning is not, for Elster, irrational, because it                           
generates informed preferences. 
Patient adaptation looks, at best, to be a lot more complex than the narrative Elster and                               
Bovens tell us about adaptive preferences, and to comprise, at least in part, a rather different                               
phenomenon. If reported increase in wellbeing is partly a matter of shifting benchmarks,                         
partly a matter of changed, rather than diminished, interests and goals, and partly a result of a                                 
changed outlook on what matters in life, it’s not clear whether the resulting preferences                           
should be considered adaptive or merely different. Bovens discusses the existence of a large                           
grey area between clear instances of sour-grapes and character planning (Bovens 1992,                       
pp.76–7). He takes there to be reasons for including cases that appear somewhere in the                             
middle of the continuum to be classed as either sour-grapes or character-planning, without                         
much indication of how to make this call, but ultimately thinks that many cases will remain                               
undecided. If patient adaptation sits in this grey area, as seems plausible, neither Elster nor                             
Bovens shed much light on the question of whether they are problematically adaptive or not.                             
Notably the formal accounts of adaptive preferences which take reflective endorsement to                       
defeat claims of irrationality (Bruckner 2009; Christman 2014) entail that much adaptation,                       
including patient adaptation, is rational and should be taken to reflect genuine preferences. 
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4. Substantive adaptive preferences 
Substantive critiques of adaptive preferences suggest that the problem lies not with the                         
process of preference formation, nor the consistency of preference sets, but with the ​content                           
of certain preferences. Martha Nussbaum’s account, for example, is explicitly normative,                     
identifying preferences as irrational when they favour those outcomes which ​ought not to be                           
preferred (2001a, p.149). The goods that it is rational to prefer are specified by her list of ten                                   
central capabilities; preferring not to have an item on the list precludes a person’s preferences                             
from inclusion in a social choice function. For Nussbaum, the items on the list constitute                             
those capabilities which are necessary for human functioning that is ‘worthy of the dignity of                             
the human being’, and their pursuit is thus normatively justified (ibid., p.148). On this                           
account, adaptive preferences are irrational not because they judge well-being against a                       
changed standard ​per se ​, but because they express a preference for something which ought                           
not to be preferred. Typically such adaptation occurs in response to conditions of extreme                           
deprivation or oppression. Nussbaum thinks that any account of adaptive preferences relies                       
on a substantive theory of the good, and the capabilities approach offers a candid and                             
reasoned account thereof. 
If patient utility values represent preferences for suboptimal outcomes, they too will                       
count as adaptive preferences on Nussbaum’s account, and thus be ruled out from use in                             
public policy decisions. Patients value, in some cases quite highly, states of being which                           
include significantly reduced physical and psychosocial function, and as such adapted patient                       
preferences violate, most plausibly, the capability for ‘bodily health’ (Nussbaum 2001b,                     
p.87). Serene Khader’s perfectionist account of adaptive preferences appears to have similar                       
implications. She argues that adaptive preferences fulfil three conditions: (1) they are                       
inconsistent with a person's basic flourishing; (2) they are formed under conditions                       
non-conducive to her basic flourishing; and (3) they would not have formed under conditions                           
which are conducive to basic flourishing (Khader 2011, p.51). As it is very likely that a                               
patient’s preferences would not have adapted had she not become ill, if her ill health is                               
inconsistent with her basic flourishing, then her adapted preferences will be adaptive in this                           
sense. While my discussion in this section engages with Nussbaum’s account, my arguments                         
equally apply to other substantive accounts of adaptive preferences, such as Khader’s. 
In order to show that patient preferences are adaptive, Nussbaum would need to show                           
that fulfilment of the capability for bodily health precludes such preferences. However this is                           
exactly the question under scrutiny: whether patient-reported utility is a good measure of                         
health-related benefit. If health is understood entirely in terms of functional status and clinical                           
evaluation, then there may be good reason to reject patient claims that their quality of life is                                 
higher than others anticipate. However there is evidence that an account of health should also                             
incorporate subjective measures of value, namely, patient reports that ‘objectively’ bad health                       
isn’t as bad as supposed, or at least doesn’t have as great an impact on quality of life as                                     
supposed, after all. To reject patient testimony on the grounds that it contradicts objective                           
measures of health begs the question, if the existence of the contradictory testimony serves to                             
question the claim that health should be measured objectively. 
Nussbaum ​does want to afford some space for subjective preferences or desires in her                           
account of well-being. First, she accepts that some individuals will reject the goods afforded                           
by her theory, and is relatively untroubled by this, as long as this rejection takes place at the                                   
level of functioning rather than the level of capability (2001a, p.154). That is, everyone is                             
free to choose not to pursue these goods, despite having the opportunity to do so, but not to                                   
deny them to others or to remove their right to them. Nussbaum also argues that ‘informed                               
desire’ should play a role in generating the values in her substantive list of capabilities, in                               
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order to ensure the set of values is one which people with diverse lifestyles and preferences                               
will live by (ibid., p.152). Her normative list is not, then, supposed to be the result of                                 
armchair theorising, but to reflect a diversity of subjective preferences. Nussbaum claims that                         
attending to what people desire is part of what it is to respect a person—to reject their                                 
subjective experience out of hand is to fail to treat them with dignity (ibid., p.154). Given                               
this, Nussbaum’s account cannot straightforwardly rule out the testimony of patients with                       
adapted preferences. Patient-reported quality of life values, for example, may provide                     
evidence that helps to define the limits of the concept of the capability for bodily health.                               
Specifically, they suggest that a purely clinical and functional account of health fails to                           
account for many patient’s experience of ill health, and that the inclusion of subjective                           
metrics into a definition of health may be necessary for capturing it adequately. In order to                               
deny this, some other reason—that is, ​not a restatement of the commitment to an objective                             
account of health—needs to be given to undermine the validity of patient testimony. 
In her discussion of adaptive preferences in the context of disability, Elizabeth Barnes                         
argues that the bar for diagnosing adaptive preferences should be set very high, and that                             
unsubstantiated diagnosis of adaptive preferences is a form of testimonial injustice (2009a;                       
2009b; 2016). Although the situation of disabled people is not identical to that of people in                               
states of ill health, her argument has relevance here. Barnes argues that to discount the                             
5
positive testimony of disabled people is to claim that the non-disabled majority is in a better                               
position to determine the well-being of disabled people than they are themselves (2016,                         
p.133). Given that it is usually assumed that for any two people, all things being equal, ​x​’s                                 
testimony is preferable to ​y​’s testimony as evidence of ​x​’s well-being, we need a good reason                               
to think that things are not equal, and that ​x​’s testimony is misrepresentative (2009a, p.10).                             
This cannot be the claim that disability is a suboptimal state, as this is exactly the matter up                                   
for debate. This looks very similar to the problem of patient adaptation. Unlike the case of                               
disability, patients do not usually claim that their state of ill health is as valuable to them as                                   
full health; instead they make the weaker claim that their state of ill health is not as bad as                                     
other people think it to be. However, at issue in both cases is the testimony of some                                 
individuals about their subjective state, which contradicts the judgements of others. 
One reason for which we might deem it appropriate to discount the preferences of                           
patients and disabled people is because, even when they have had past experience of full                             
health and functional range, their range of options is limited, and in some cases limited in                               
such a way that cannot be changed. It is psychologically advantageous for people with                           
limited options to adapt their preferences to avoid cognitive dissonance, but these coping                         
mechanisms mask lower levels of well-being (Barnes 2009b, p.344). Barnes points out that                         
the fact that a state constrains options, or involves functional limitations, even permanently,                         
doesn’t itself make preferences formed within that state adaptive (2016, p.59). Being born                         
with male sex organs entails not being able to bear and give birth to children. However we                                 
5 The distinction between disability and ill health, particularly chronic and irreversible ill health, is not                               
a clean one, and at least partly a matter of convention. I maintain the distinction for the sake of this                                       
discussion, mainly due to differences in the way in which well-being is measured in the set of people                                   
Barnes and I are respectively concerned with. Barnes focuses on disabled people’s testimony that their                             
lives are as valuable as those of non-disabled people, whereas my main concern here is patients                               
reporting their quality of life through some kind of preference elicitation tool, which often results in                               
higher-than-expected utility values. There may well be significant overlap between these two groups,                         
but claiming that your life is as valuable as someone else’s need not entail the claim that you                                   
experience the same level of utility or the same quality of life as them. 
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don’t think of people with male sex organs as having problematically constrained options due                           
to this inability, or consider their well-being to be lower because of it.  
Indeed, ​everyone’s goals, pursuits and expectations are developed within a context of                       
their functional limitations (Barnes 2016, p.132). I don’t compare my sporting ability with an                           
olympic athlete, nor do I judge my strength-to-weight ratio against that of an ant.                           
Furthermore, my goals and life plans are constructed roughly with the expectation that I will                             
live an averagely long and disability-free life, not in the expectation that I will live to 150                                 
years, or die in an accident tomorrow. My goals, pursuits, and expectations of my ability are                               
relativised to my own capacity and context, which includes things like my species                         
membership, my physical function and capacity, but also the behaviour of others around me,                           
the set of people to whom I take it to be relevant to compare my welfare, and my                                   
understanding of my own capabilities. If my capacity or context changes in some relevant                           
way, it is seemingly appropriate for my behaviour and preferences to change as well, or at                               
least to be liable to change. If there isn’t good reason to think that it is only the internal                                     
standards of patients that adapt according their context, then there doesn’t seem to be good                             
reason to take patient adaptation to be peculiarly problematic. Characterising patients as                       
misguided about their reported utility on the basis of their functional limitation might entail                           
very restrictive claims about people’s ability to report their own subjective states in general,                           
given the universality of functional limitations. This is consonant with the literature on                         
hedonic adaptation. Adaptation is typically taken to be a ubiquitous phenomenon, something                       
which all people experience, rather than something reserved for exceptional instances of loss                         
or gain (Brickman and Campbell 1971, p.289). While disease and disability may present                         
particular questions for adaptation—for example if they generate sudden downwards shifts in                       
affect, rather than gradual change—perhaps they aren’t categorically different from other                     
instances of adaptation (​ibid​, p.292). 
However, the limited function of disabled people and patients may differ from ‘ordinary’                         
limited function. One such difference could be that disabled people and patients don't know                           
what they’re missing out on, and so mis-value their experiences by failing to make a salient                               
comparison with non-disabled or non-diseased states (Barnes 2016, p.120). Of course this                       
often not true in the case of disability—most disabled people have non-congenital                       
disabilities—and is even less likely to be true in the case of ill health, the vast majority of                                   
which is acquired. It’s furthermore unclear that non-disabled and healthy people are in a                           
better position than disabled people and patients in this respect, unless they have had past                             
experience of the disability or condition in question themselves. Moreover, however,                     
typically we don’t require people to know what it’s like to be in a different state to give                                   
positive testimony (or any testimony at all) about what it’s like to be in that state. For                                 
example, it’s appropriate for a woman to give testimony about the value of being a woman                               
and about her quality of life as a woman, despite not having identified as a man or as                                   
genderqueer at any point in her life. Even when people do not have experience of any other                                 
states of health or disability, there may not be sufficient reason for discounting their                           
testimony about their own well-being. 
Another possible distinguishing characteristic of the functional limitations of disabled                   
people and patients is that, if they have a ​mere lack of functions and abilities rather than a                                   
different set of functions, such that the options they are left with are simply a subset of the                                   
functions of non-disabled, non-diseased people, there may be reason to think that their                         
preferences are malformed. The claim here is that having fewer options is necessarily worse                           
than having more options to choose from: functional absences shouldn’t be confused with                         
functional differences. This is pretty implausible in the case of disability: while some                         
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disabilities do involve a lack (blindness, deafness, paralysis), compelling testimony from                     
disability activists tells us that disability also gives rise to new abilities, liberation from                           
cultural norms, and unique positive experiences. Blind people, for example, cannot judge                       
people on the basis of how they look, and so sidestep some of the prejudicial attitudes that                                 
sighted people cannot help but adopt; congenitally deaf people have the experience of having                           
signing as a first language (Barnes 2016, p.95). In the case of illness, however, this objection                               
is somewhat more plausible. Unlike in the case of disability, where many disabled people                           
report not only valuing their disabled existence, but say that they would rather be disabled                             
than non-disabled (ibid., p.119), it’s much less easy to identify the positive aspects of ill                             
health, and most patient-reported well-being ​is ​lower than the reported well-being of                       
non-patients. 
However, clearly not all instances of reduced function—even when they can be                       
understood as a mere lack—give us reason to discount someone’s testimony about their                         
well-being. The fact that I cannot run as fast as an olympic sprinter, nor play the violin as                                   
well as the leader of the London Symphony Orchestra—even if I am functionally equivalent                           
to them in other respects—and the fact that these are not plausible career options for me, does                                 
not discount my claim that I value being a philosopher, nor my reports of my own well-being.                                 
If some types or degrees of functional limitation ​are reason to discount testimony about                           
well-being, while others are not, some specification of why and when this occurs is needed.                             
And of course, this cannot make reference to the inherent sub-optimality of ill health per se ​,                               
as this is precisely the matter in question. To claim that the lack of some health-related                               
functions inherently compromises or discounts the testimony of patients begs the question as                         
to whether patient preferences should be discounted. 
Given that patient reports of quality of life themselves provide evidence to suggest that ill                             
health is not the deeply suboptimal outcome that it is sometimes supposed to be, the                             
substantive model of adaptive preferences can’t explain the irrationality of the adapted                       
preferences of patients without begging the question. Nussbaum’s substantive approach, like                     
Elster’s and Bovens’ accounts, fails to show that patient adaptation is adaptive in a                           
problematic way. Classifying all patient preferences as irrational would require a                     
characterisation of ill health as suboptimal, which assumes the deficiency of the very                         
testimony under consideration. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
My discussion has not attempted to critique or vindicate any of the three accounts of adaptive                               
preferences discussed. However, I have suggested that, on any of these accounts, it is at best                               
indeterminate whether patient adaptation amounts to adaptive preference formation. A                   
detailed evaluation of patient adaptation seems to point to a complex picture, including some                           
negative and some positive changes, but it’s unclear that these are any different from the                             
ways in which any person’s preferences respond to changes in their physical and                         
psychological function, with age, for example, or the ways in which all humans—all                         
biological organisms—respond to changes in their environment. 
I don’t intend to rule out the possibility of adaptive preferences being determinable in                           
other contexts, though I think Barnes is right to say that the bar for attributing adaptive                               
preferences should be set very high. To say that someone’s preferences are incorrect or                           
misguided is to say that other people can determine their preferences better than they can                             
themselves. Unjustified testimonial denial is a serious injustice, so great care should be taken                           
to ensure that the preferences in question really are defective. However, prototypical                       
instances of adaptive preference formation typically have characteristics which distinguish                   
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them from the kinds of hedonic adaptation that occurs in patients and the disabled. Adaptive                             
preferences in contexts of domestic abuse and forced incarceration, for example, are linked to                           
gas-lighting and psychological manipulation, which engender perceived inferiority. Other                 
kinds of adaptive preferences, those arising in deeply sexist and racist contexts, for example,                           
involve structural inequality and systematically differential treatment according to oppressive                   
norms, leading to similar psychological effects. 
Certainly there is significant stigmatisation of many physically and cognitively impaired                     
people, which is liable to engender feelings of shame and low status, and might point to some                                 
instances of adaptive preferences in disabled people and patients. However, most illnesses                       
and patients are not stigmatised in this way, and it’s implausible to suppose that people                             
develop such a sense of inferiority simply due to the limitations brought on by having a                               
disease or disability. Where stigmatisation of patients and people with disabilities does occur                         
to the extent that patients are led to question their own evaluative standpoint and their                             
capacities as a judge of their own actions and and those of others, this may well constitute a                                   
good reason for questioning the representativeness of their preferences. Of course, it would                         
be surprising to think that think that this should lead to the rejection of the patient perspective                                 
in favour of a public perspective, the latter presumably being the source of the stigmatisation                             
in question. 
Adapted preferences are not identical to adaptive preferences. As such, adapted patient                       
preferences cannot easily be characterised as misguided or irrational, nor can they be                         
excluded from social choice functions, and the disability paradox remains unsolved. This                       
means that patient preferences remain salient in decision-making about healthcare resource                     
distribution, though it doesn’t entail that patient preferences are necessarily the right set of                           
preferences to use in all assessments of cost-effectiveness and health benefit. Sometimes                       
public preferences, which represent apprehension about entering into a health state, rather                       
than any experience of being in that state, may be appropriate, especially, perhaps, in                           
decision-making about preventative healthcare and public health. However, adaptation does                   
not alone undermine the authenticity of preferences. Furthermore, adaptation should not be                       
regarded as an exceptional phenomenon: all preferences are contextually anchored to some                       
extent, and as such responsive to environment and circumstantial change.  
6
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